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Abstract The hopes and fears expressed in the debate
on human enhancement are not always based on a
realistic assessment of the expected possibilities. Dis-
cussions about extreme scenarios may at times obscure
the ethical and policy issues that are relevant today. This
paper aims to contribute to an adequate and ethically
sound societal response to actual current developments.
After a brief outline of the ethical debate concerning
neuro-enhancement, it describes the current state of the
art in psychopharmacological science and current uses
of psychopharmacological enhancement, as well as the
prospects for the near future. It then identifies ethical
issues regarding psychopharmacological enhancements
that require attention from policymakers, both on the
professional and on the governmental level. These
concern enhancement research, the gradual expansion
of medical categories, off-label prescription and respon-
sibility of doctors, and accessibility of enhancers on the
Internet. It is concluded that further discussion on the
advantages and drawbacks of enhancers on a collective
social level is still needed.
Keywords Psychopharmacology . Enhancement .
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Introduction
Over the past decade, possibilities for human enhance-
ment have been hotly debated in bioethics, especially
with regard to genetics and new and emerging bio-
technologies. More recently, this discussion also turned
to the possibilities for enhancing mental functioning of
people. The enhancement of mood and cognition,
especially by means of psychoactive drugs, has raised
significant controversy. Some see a great enhanced
future ahead, while others dread a decline of important
human values if neuro-enhancement were possible.
These hopes and fears are not always based on a
realistic view of what is and might be possible with
regard to neuro-enhancement and in our view this
sometimes interferes with formulating adequate policies
and regulations alongside the development of new
enhancement technologies.
In this paper we will first give a brief outline of the
ethical debate concerning neuro-enhancement, and
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then describe the current state of affairs and the
prospects that we consider to be realistic. Departing
from this assessment, we will identify the present and
emerging ethical issues regarding psychopharmaco-
logical enhancements that require attention from
policymakers, both on the professional and on the
governmental level. Our aim is to contribute to an
adequate and ethically sound societal response to
these developments.
Overview of the Debate
The ethical debate on psychopharmacological en-
hancement is taking place at the intersection of two
related fields. First, it is part of the emerging field of
neuroethics, which has been booming since the term
was coined in 2002 [1–4]. Second, it is part of the
wider debate on human enhancement, which has been
going on since about the late 1980’s [5–8] and is
concerned with all kinds of human enhancements—
from cosmetic surgery to genetic modification of our
offspring.
The specific issue of enhancing mental functions
through medicines has been discussed in a number of
publications. Before the discussion was even framed
in terms of ‘enhancement’, two drugs especially
raised social concern and ethical discussion: fluox-
etine (Prozac®) and methylphenidate (Ritalin®).
These are existing drugs that are prescribed for
recognized diseases—clinical depression and ADHD
respectively—but that are also used for a wider range
of purposes than the treatment of these diseases.
Prozac® was popular in the 1990’s to improve
personality traits and to diminish feelings of sadness
or alienation that, according to some, simply belong
to normal life [9, 10]. Ritalin® was allegedly being
used to subdue bouncy children as well as to help
students cram for exams [11]. The main issues in this
debate circled around medicalization, normalization
and social adaptation on the one hand, versus
diversity and authenticity on the other.
With the advance of new technologies, especially
drugs that promise to enhance cognitive capacities, a
new phase in the neuro-enhancement debate has
started. The discussion has become directed not at
the use of existing drugs, but more and more at the
expectations of the use of future drugs, which are yet
to be developed [12–14]. The ethical issues that are
raised here concern, among others, safety and risks;
justice and equal opportunity; coercion and social
pressure; and identity and authenticity.
The promise of new wonder drugs, or other
technologies that might enhance cognitive and other
mental functions such as DBS or TMS, has invoked
roughly two types of reaction: utopian and dystopian
[15]. On the one hand, there are those who argue in
favor of enhancing ourselves. They are opposed to
bans on such new technologies and see great
prospects for the future of humanity; some even
promote our transformation into posthuman beings [8,
16, 17]. On the other hand, there are the bioconserva-
tives who oppose enhancement technologies and fear
that these will corrupt and degrade us and rob us of
what is ‘naturally human’ [6, 18, 19].
A significant part of the debate on human
enhancement, we assert, suffers from inflated expec-
tations and technology hype. This part of the debate
focuses on Enhancements with a capital E: enhance-
ments that go beyond what we currently understand
as the normal or naturally human. Giving people
infrared vision, engineering them with perfect pitch,
doubling or tripling their IQ, overcoming our need for
sleep, or achieving immortality are all unlikely
prospects for the near future [20]. While speculating
about our future powers and future scenarios is
exciting and may be a very useful way to explore
emerging ethical issues related to science and tech-
nology [23], the high expectations that are raised also
serve certain interests. To attract attention, allies and
large-scale investment potential benefits are hyped up
and risks and costs are played down. Inevitably,
however, this will provoke a reaction and fuel and
enflame widespread concerns and anxieties about risk
[21].
In the same line, Nordmann warns against what he
calls speculative ethics [22]. Speculative ethics invites
us to discuss the pros and cons of emerging
technologies as if such technologies were upon us
already. One should be cautious that ethical questions
that already present themselves with regard to the
current state of technology are not obscured. There
are numerous important ethical and policy questions
to be asked with regard to less spectacular forms of
enhancement—enhancements with a small e—that are
possible already, or will be in the near future. Breast
implants, growth hormone for short children, improv-
ing alertness or adjusting to sleep depletion with
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psychopharmacology, are all examples of this. We
agree with Nordmann that we should stay ‘close on
the heels’ of new emerging technologies and the
ethical issues that they present.
In this paper we will therefore focus on what we
take to be a realistic perspective and assess the present
and emerging ethical issues regarding psychopharma-
cological enhancements for the near future. With
psychopharmacological enhancements we will mean
pharmacological interventions that are intended to
improve certain mental functions and that go beyond
currently accepted medical indications.
Psychopharmacology and Enhancement: State
of the Art
Presently, the main focus of attention in the discus-
sion on psychopharmacology and enhancement seems
to be on cognitive enhancement. This includes a large
variety of functions such as concentration, alertness,
working memory, long-term memory et cetera. En-
hancing effects on cognition can only be shown on
the level of such distinct functions. ‘Intelligence’ is a
trait that many would like to see enhanced, but it is a
far too complex and multi-faceted trait to be enhanced
by one single intervention.
Enhancement of other than cognitive functions
currently receives less attention, both in the ethical
discussion as in neuroscientific research. SSRI’s, like
the drug fluoxetine (Prozac®) that once initiated the
hype on mood enhancement, have hardly any proven
effects in healthy volunteers. It certainly does not
elevate a normal mood to a happy one, although it
does appear to reduce negative affect (sadness,
anxiety) and promote affiliative behavior [24].
The psychopharmacological substances that are
potential cognitive enhancers can be distinguished
into two categories: drugs that are already on the
market for specific indications, like Alzheimer’s
disease, ADHD or narcolepsy, and (classes of) drugs
that are being developed. The first group includes
donepezil, modafinil, guanfacine, methylphenidate
and various dopamine agonists. The second group
consists of substances in the research stage and is
aimed at the AMPA receptor, the NMDA receptor or
CREB (cAMP response binding protein).
In a systematic review of the proven effects of
these drugs in healthy subjects we concluded that they
do have some cognitive enhancing effects, specifical-
ly on working memory, executive functioning (spatial
planning ability), sustained attention and episodic
memory [24].
Interestingly, one of the most frequently discussed
cognition enhancers, modafinil, appears to be most
effective during suboptimal performance, due to
either sleep deprivation, or ‘lower natural abilities’.
So far, no studies have found any positive effects of
the drug in subjects already performing at optimal
levels. Moreover, the effects that have been found are
modest. In one study, the effects on alertness and
performance during sleep deprivation are comparable
to those of 600 mg of caffeine (six cups of coffee) and
modafinil improves performance in only 6 out of 29
cognitive tests [25, 26].
Another much debated drug is methylphenidate
(Ritalin®). Since this is a psychostimulant it does
keep you awake and alert. However, it does not
appear to have effect on concentration or sustained
attention in healthy volunteers [27]. Moreover,
while methylphenidate enhances executive function
on novel tasks, it impairs previously established
performance.
The fact that the enhancing effects of the present
generation of psychopharmacological substances are
modest does not, of course, imply that future drugs
will not have more forceful effects. There appear to
be, however, a number of underlying mechanisms
that—if they apply to cognitive enhancement in
general—may temper enthusiasm as well as worries
about the non-medical or commercial use of these
psychoactive agents. Common phenomena that arise
across different neurotransmitter systems and with
different pharmacological agents suggest that we
may be able to formulate general principles of a
inverted U shape response and trade-offs. First, as
cognition-enhancing drugs can simultaneously exert
both linear and quadratic (U-shaped) effects, doses
most effective in facilitating one function could at
the same time exert null or even detrimental effects
on other cognitive domains. This means that they
will likely not improve over all performance, but
enhance some functions while impairing others.
Second, studies on dopamine augmentation pro-
vide some support for a baseline dependency:
individuals with a ‘low memory span’ benefit from
administration of dopamine agonists, whereas ‘high
span subjects’ are ‘overdosed’ and show a deteriora-
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tion of performance. So, naturally low performing
subjects may benefit more than those who perform
well already.
Finally, there is evidence that a number of trade-
offs are likely to occur: enhancement of long-term
memory could impair working memory; enhancing
the consolidation of long-term memory might disrupt
the ability of new information to modify those
memories and thus to respond adequately to a
changed environment; and increases of cognitive
stability (which benefits working memory mainte-
nance) come at the cost of a decreased capacity to
flexibly alter behavior.
With regard to future targets for enhancing cogni-
tion, the development of the ampakines appears to be
furthest along. Even there, however, there has been a
paucity of studies on human volunteers. It remains to
be seen whether these drugs really do prove to be any
more effective than the currently available enhancers,
and if they do not run into the same ‘practical
problems’ and tradeoffs discussed above. Though
sudden scientific breakthroughs can never be exclud-
ed, for the near future it seems likely that only modest
enhancement of mental function will be attainable.
Current and Future Uses of Cognitive Enhancers
In this paper we do not want to focus on hypothetical
cases—what if we suddenly had perfectly effective
and safe enhancers?—but try to assess the current and
near future developments regarding psychopharmaco-
logical enhancement. We see a number of routes
along which psychopharmacological enhancement
will probably develop, influenced by various social,
institutional and psychological factors.
First, development of new drugs will most likely
take place not under the banner of ‘enhancement’ but
as normal medical or neuroscientific research aimed
at treating diseases such as Alzheimer, the cognitive
impairments of schizophrenia, ADHD, autism-spec-
trum disorders et cetera. As Juengst and collegues
formulate it “most interventions that might be used
for the enhancement of the healthy will be developed
under the aegis of perfectly legitimate medical
concerns to treat and prevent traditionally defined
disease, disability, and suffering in the sick […]
enhancement interventions will appear, fait accompli,
as ‘off-label’ applications of existing medical tools”
[28].1 Given the current regulations, purposeful
development of drugs aimed at the enhancement of
normal functioning is not opportune for pharmaceu-
tical companies. Nick Bostrom therefore points out
the need for changing existing regulations: “The
disease centered framework impedes the development
of safe and effective enhancing medicines” [30].
Though we believe this is an important discussion
that should be conducted, it is not to be expected that
existing regulative frameworks will change radically
in the near future and for the time being existing
regulations will guide the developments.
Second, disease categories in the field of mental
health are likely to expand and come to include states,
behavior patterns, personality traits and the like that
are at present not recognized as disorders. Since the
first edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was published in
1952, more than four hundred new categories of
mental illness have been conceived [31]. In part, these
expanded or new disease categories can be under-
stood as the product of ‘disease mongering’: more or
less conscious attempts of the pharmaceutical industry
(and of scientists and physicians with similar inter-
ests) to create new diseases in order to sell more drugs
[32]. This is already happening at the moment, for
instance with the emergence of disorders like shift-
worker’s sleep disorder, age-associated memory im-
pairment, involuntary emotional expression, or female
sexual dysfunction. By labeling formerly ‘normal’
states as disorders or diseases, they become legitimate
goals of pharmacotherapy; and by smart marketing
techniques awareness is raised among both patients
and doctors regarding the existence of these new
disorders, as well as the possibilities for treatment.
For another part, the boundaries of existing
disorders, like ADHD or autism, will be stretched
and expanded without any conscious efforts of
disease mongerers. When diagnostic tools become
more sensitive and when symptoms are recognized
more widely because of a greater awareness of
disorders more people will be diagnosed as having a
disorder. This can be understood as either proper
diagnosis of formerly under-recognized diseases, or as
forms of medicalization and normalization [33, 34].
Moreover, once the worst cases have been properly
1 Off-label use is the prescription of drugs for a purpose that is
not included in the drug's approved label
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treated, attention will naturally shift to those with
fewer symptoms. The boundaries of what is consid-
ered ‘normal’ may thus shift. Both processes will help
to expand the use of psychopharmacological substan-
ces beyond what we currently see as proper medical
indications. Within this contested area it is not
obvious but rather a matter of fierce dispute whether
we are talking about treatment or enhancement—or
perhaps, in some cases of disease mongering, even
about selling illusions.
Finally, the use of cognitive— or mood enhancing
drugs may expand due to increasing knowledge of the
general public regarding the existence of enhancers
and the easy online access to all kind of ‘smart drugs’.
Psychoactive medication is already being used for
enhancement purposes by a number of people. The
best-known example is that of students using Ritalin®
or similar psychostimulant medication as a study aid,
to improve attention or remain alert. In the USA 6,9
to 16,2% of college students is reported to have used
psychostimulants for this purpose [35–37]. A recent
study in the Netherlands showed that 2,4% of the
students between 12–18 years have used medication
for non-medical purposes in the past year. Half of
them (1,2%) used Ritalin®; it is not clear whether this
was used to improve concentration and attention in
study, or for partying and the ‘high’ effect of Ritalin®
[38]. In Belgium, a recent poll among 1,500 univer-
sity students showed that 3% used psychostimulants
during their exam periods; another poll indicated that
this might even be up to 20% [39]. A recent Internet
poll conducted by Nature, to which 1,400 scientists
from 60 different countries reacted, revealed that one
in five2 scientists uses psychoactive drugs for non-
medical purposes [40]. Of those using enhancers,
62% used methylphenidate, and 44% modafinil. The
most popular reason for taking the drugs was to
improve concentration. Improving focus for a specific
task (admittedly difficult to distinguish from concen-
tration) ranked a close second and counteracting jet
lag ranked fourth, after ‘various reasons’.3
Attitudes about the use of psychoactive medi-
cation for enhancement purposes vary significantly.
Some people are enthusiastic and willing to try
while others are afraid of potential risks, or
consider it to be a form of cheating [41]. Attitudes
may vary with a country’s general attitude towards
drugs. The Netherlands for example are well-known
for their pharmacological Calvinism—the use of
medication is much lower than in countries such as
France or Spain. At the same time, attitudes towards
drugs like marijuana or narcotics may be more
liberal. Some population groups may have specific
attitudes: according to a Dutch study many of the
students using off-label medication also used other
(illegal) drugs and experimented with all kinds of
different substances [38]. Some of them were
problematic drug-users or had psychosocial prob-
lems. The group of scientists from the Nature poll,
on the other hand, apparently is well informed and
consciously calculates the desired effects and possi-
ble risks. Different practices of medication use for
enhancement purposes may thus exist and develop
further in the future: incidental boosts for special
occasions; continuous use to improve performance in
high-pressure competitive surroundings; experimen-
tation for curiosity or fun; substance abuse and auto-
medication of mental problems. The fact that it is so
easy to learn about enhancers and to purchase them
on the Internet stimulates this. It is possible for some
groups to use enhancing substances in a conscious
and well-informed way, but the same drugs can often
also be abused by less informed and more vulnerable
people.
In summary, we believe that in the near future
new psychoactive medication will be developed
that is primarily intended for specific disorders or
diseases, but that can have enhancing effects on
various mental functions in healthy people as well.
These effects will probably be moderate, will
enhance certain functions while impeding others,
and may not work equally well for everyone. The
use of these psychoactive drugs is likely to expand
beyond current medical indications along any of
three lines:
1) Prescription use for ‘under recognized’ or ‘newly
recognized’ disorders
2) Off-label prescription of medication for enhance-
ment purposes
3) Non-prescription use of medication for enhance-
ment purposes
2 It must be noted that this figure is not based on a represen-
tative sample
3 Some of the respondents of the three mentioned polls
obtained medication by prescription while others purchased
the drugs on the Internet or got them from friends or relatives.
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Ethics & Policies
Starting from this scenario we will now analyze the
most important ethical questions that need to be
addressed by public policy, and formulate some
policy advices.
Should the Government Prohibit or Promote
Enhancement Research?
A first important issue is whether the development of
enhancing drugs should be forbidden or on the
contrary, as some philosophers argue, whether we
have a moral obligation to pursue enhancement [8,
52].
The argument for a moral duty to enhance is often
made from a utilitarian point of view: if a certain
development or intervention will benefit us, both
individually and as a society, it ought to be pursued.
The assumption of proponents is that the development
and use of enhancers will create benefits—longer,
healthier, happier, better lives for more people. Harris
even defines enhancements as those interventions or
techniques that do benefit us in this way, which
makes the duty to enhance a re-statement of a general
duty of beneficence. As such, the duty to enhance is
an imperfect duty: a duty to aim at a certain end. In
contrast to perfect duties, imperfect duties do not spell
out exactly when and how to act. While perfect duties
clearly describe the acts do be done (or omitted, in
case of negative duties) and the conditions under
which these ought to be done, imperfect duties allow
more latitude. It is typical for imperfect duties that the
acts they require cannot be spelled out exactly but
give persons some freedom to decide how and on
what occasions to fulfill them. Therefore, an imper-
fect duty to enhance (i.e. a duty of beneficence) does
not give us much direction or guidance. It is unclear
to whom this duty applies (the government, organ-
izations that fund research, biomedical researchers,
doctors, all of us); what it implies (exactly which
actions are required?); and under what conditions it
applies. Finally, it remains unclear how we are
supposed to prioritize the myriad ways in which we
could benefit people. Why develop cognitive
enhancers and not malaria drugs? Why spend money
on drug development instead of education?
In order to transform this very general imperfect
duty of enhancement into one or more perfect duties,
a number of steps needs to be taken to specify whom
the duty addresses, which concrete actions it requires
and under what conditions it applies. All these steps
will require additional arguments, deliberation about
concrete cases informed by relevant empirical data,
and weighing against other moral duties (like a duty
of justice, or other ways of fulfilling a duty of
beneficence). Until those steps are taken a ‘duty to
enhance’ appears to be little more than a pro-attitude
to enhancement.
A very problematic move in the discussion on the
duty to enhance is the fact that enhancement is too
easily equated with beneficence. The proponents of a
duty to enhance either define enhancement as bene-
ficial [8], or claim that if enhancements benefit us, it
is our duty to pursue them [52]. However, by doing so
they avoid the important discussion on whether
various types of enhancements do indeed benefit us.
In the case of psychopharmacological enhancers it is
not obvious that they will, not only because we
presently lack sufficient empirical evidence about
effects and side-effects, but also on a more funda-
mental level because it is not clear what conception of
a good life or a good society we ought to use to assess
the effects of enhancement. From a utilitarian point of
view only the net happiness of the largest number of
people may count, but other views on the good life
stress different aspects of well-being. For example,
many people would find it problematic to use
enhancers if this would affect their self-identity [53].
With regard to the individual good life the liberal
solution is to let everyone have his own way (as long
as it does not cause serious harm to others). With
regard to the good society, however, the question is
more complex and requires, at least, more public
discussion. A ‘wake enhancing’ substance like mod-
afinil could have important social effects, e.g. on our
working schedules and on the 24/7 economy. It is not
obvious that this will be an overall benefit for society
(or individuals) [42].
Another aspect is that of justice. Especially from a
perspective of global justice it is not obvious that
developing cognitive enhancers should have priority
over, say, developing new anti-malaria drugs. A lot of
lives could be saved and health could be much
improved for many people by developing and
distributing medication for old-fashioned treatment
purposes, so it is not clear at all that investing money,
time and expertise in developing cognitive enhancers
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would make more people better off.4 Even if it would
increase net happiness in the world, the question of
distributive justice could still be held against this
utilitarian point of view.
For these reasons we believe it is too quick to
claim that the development of psychopharmacological
enhancers is a moral obligation, or that it should have
any special priority over the development of other
drugs.
Although we do not argue for any special priority
for research on enhancing drugs, we see no reason
why such research should be categorically prohibited.
Freedom of research is an important good and one
must have serious reasons to prohibit research.
Enhancement might have undesirable societal effects
in the long run, like unjust inequalities or pressure to
use them, but we believe these should give rise to
regulation and careful application, not to a general
prohibition of research5. A more practical argument is
that the development of enhancing drugs is often the
spin-off of medical research and thus difficult to
prohibit altogether. It is often impossible to tell in
advance what the effects and applications of new
findings will be. Moreover, if enhancing drugs are
prescribed off label or used without prescription, it is
useful to know about their effects and side effects in
healthy subjects as well. If we are willing to discuss
the option of allowing some drugs on the market for
enhancement purposes, we must have sufficient
knowledge about them. Testing the effectiveness and
side-effects of enhancing drugs even appears to be
indispensable, because it would provide important
facts necessary for further decision making about the
regulation of such drugs [54, 55]. The important
question is therefore not if research ought to be
allowed, but what moral framework ought to be used
to regulate research with enhancing substances in
human subjects; whether research should be restricted
to those aiming at improving medical knowledge and
therapies or including purposes of enhancement [55].
For now this discussion renders two important
conclusions for policymaking. First, that it is neither
ethically justified, nor practical, to prohibit the
research and development of enhancing drugs; on
the other hand, it is not yet clear that there is a moral
obligation to promote such development either, e.g.
by publicly funded research. More work is needed to
specify the imperfect duty of beneficence, in order to
render perfect duties concerning enhancement-
research and development. Second, the ethics of
research into potentially enhancing psychopharma-
ceuticals deserves separate attention.
How to Evaluate the Expansion of Medical
Categories?
The expansion of existing medical categories and
the emergence of new medical categories promoted
by pharmaceutical companies are processes that
require a critical evaluation. Both processes are
examples of medicalization: social processes in
which more and more aspects of daily life come
to be seen in medical terms, and problems come to
be understood in a medical framework. This also
implies an increase in medical interventions. Med-
icalization can be a moral good: many people who
experience real problems may be helped by new
therapies or by the mere recognition of their
problems. There are, however, also some morally
problematic aspects to medicalization.
First, the harm-benefit ratio of medication deserves
constant attention. While the risks and side effects of
medication are acceptable if they cure disease or
improve the quality of life of people, these same risks
and side effects may become unacceptable when
benefits are small. The smaller the benefit that is
created by pharmacological intervention, the more
serious the possible risks, and the lack of information
regarding long-term effects, should be taken. When
drugs that have been tested and admitted for serious
diseases and complaints, come to be used more and
more by those who are less seriously afflicted, the
risks-benefit ratio that used to be acceptable in the
serious cases, may shift to unacceptable. This is still
insufficiently recognized. For example, large numbers
of people have been prescribed SSRI’s for mild
4 Sometimes it is claimed that if we had effective cognitive
enhancers, this would enable our scientists to be smarter and to
work harder and come up with new technologies and other
findings (like a cure for malaria) that would benefit us all.
Enhance our scientists, and they will create technology to
improve the lives of the rest of us. This argument appears to be
overly optimistic about the powers of science and technology,
and ignores the fact that most problems of (global) injustice and
inequality have nothing to do with a lack of technological
power but rather with politics, institutions and governance.
5 Most technological advances bring risks or adverse effects
with them, but this is not generally seen as a reason to prohibit
technological development altogether.
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depressive complaints, while their effectiveness has
only been (contestably) proven for very serious
clinical depression [43, 56]. According to a study of
the Health Committee of the British Parliament in
2005, 95% of antidepressant users are exposed to the
drugs’ risks and side-effects without clear evidence
that the drugs benefit them [43]. So, physicians ought
to make their own risk-benefit assessments for
individual patients, keeping in mind this shift in
risk-benefit ratio. They ought to consider the serious-
ness of the patient’s condition and his degree of
suffering. Such consideration also ought to be
included in professional guidelines regarding the
use of psychopharmaceuticals. However, as we
will discuss later on, the influence of pharmaceu-
tical industries and lack of reliable scientific data
may hinder objective assessment and prescription
practices.
A second problem of medicalization is the focus on
medication or other medical interventions as the
solution to complex problems. Such a focus leaves
less room for alternative approaches like psychother-
apy, lifestyle changes or educational or pedagogical
measures that may have less side-effects than medi-
cation, or may be more effective6.
Third, an important related issue is that social
factors contributing to problems are downplayed in
comparison to individual biological and psychological
factors. With adult ADHD, for example, the increased
pressure to perform and to keep up the pace of our
hectic society is not really recognized as part of the
problem. The problems that patients encounter are
individualized instead of socialized.7 Increasing per-
formance pressure in an increasingly complex society
leads to growing numbers of people who cannot keep
up the pace and cannot live up to the high expect-
ations. Likewise, the current focus on happiness as the
ultimate goal in life, alongside the claims that
happiness can be ‘made’ and that everyone is
responsible for their own happiness, makes more
and more people feel they fail [43].
Finally, especially in cases of disease mongering
medicalization works by emphasising and magnifying
existing problems, or even by stimulating feelings of
insufficiency, insecurity, unhappiness or underper-
formance in people who did not feel that way before.
In brief: people are made to feel miserable first, in
order to help relief this misery afterwards by offering
a medical label and accompanying treatment. Adver-
tisements and other marketing instruments are
employed to ‘sell sickness’. People are influenced
into believing they have a problem that they did not
realize they had before. Such practices should be
understood as a violation of the principle of non-
maleficence. It would indeed be more honest, and
probably do less harm, if medication to enhance
certain traits would be clearly named as such, and not
sold under the guise of ‘treatment’. As Bostrom
rightly remarks, however, current regulatory frame-
works make this difficult [30].
The gradual expansion of medical categories is a
process that professionals and professional organiza-
tions, as well as patient and consumer organizations,
should be aware of. They should learn to recognize
the mechanisms that are at work in expanding disease
categories and of their own role in these processes—
doctors still hold an important power in defining what
disease is. The risks and negative effects of drawing
disease boundaries too narrow (underdiagnosis and
undertreatment) have to be weighed against the risks
of drawing them too wide (over treatment, stigmati-
zation). This should have a place in professional
training and education programs. Professional organ-
izations ought to stimulate awareness and discussion
among their members, for example by publications in
their journals, and organization of workshops and
symposia8.
The problem of influence of the drug companies on
research, medical guidelines and medication use is
very complex and does not have one single easy
6 Examples: people with symptoms of ADHD may be helped
by learning to use schedules and reminders; or by regulating the
amount of external stimuli. People who are anxious and shy
may benefit from cognitive psychotherapy or social skills
training. Shift workers may benefit from a less strenuous
schedule with more time to recuperate.
7 In the Netherlands, there is currently an increase in the
number of young adults on a special social benefit scheme for
young people who are unable to work because of medical
reasons. This increase is due to the increasing numbers of
young adults that are diagnosed with ADHD and related
disorders like ADD or PDD-NOS. Instead of labelling these
young people as abnormal and excluding them from participa-
tion in society, one might also improve and adapt working
conditions for them.
8 A good example is the Dutch Association for General
Practitioners, which recently organised a masterclass with Iona
Heath to discuss disease mongering with Dutch GPs. The
discussion was published in a Dutch medical journal [60].
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solution. Only a combination of actions and regula-
tions will be able to improve the current situation. We
believe that the influence of the pharmaceutical
industry on physicians and patient organizations
should be strictly regulated, and awareness should
be raised, e.g. through initiatives such as No Free
Lunch (UK and USA) and Healthy Skepticism
(Australia, The Netherlands). Direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising of medication should remain prohibited as it
currently is in Europe. Major biomedical journals
have requirements for manuscripts such as statements
of authors accepting responsibility for the conduct of
the study, that they had access to data and whether the
authors controlled the decision to publish [61]. It
seems these requirements are not sufficient to avoid
the phenomenon of ghostwriting and ghostmanage-
ment: pharmaceutical companies that influence and
control the research, analysis, writing and publication
of articles [62]. Moffatt and Elliott for example
propose a few measures to combat ghostwriting
practice, such as the installment of a task force whose
task is to track cases of ghostwriting and to sanction
authors as well as to inform the public about
ghostwritten papers [63]. There are no easy solutions
to avoid such phenomena but at the least awareness of
all parties involved (investigators, universities, editors
etc) of the mechanisms of company influence may
help create adequate measures.
May Doctors Prescribe Off-Label for Enhancement
Purposes?
Before a drug can be marketed, a registration
authority (the FDA in the USA, the EMEA in Europe)
ensures itself of the safety and effectiveness of the
pharmaceutical company’s product. Safety and effec-
tiveness are determined in light of the specific
purpose of the product. Approval of a product implies
approval of the label for that product. That label
should include detailed information about the product,
approved indication dosage, method of administra-
tion, and use in specific populations [44]. This means
that when a drug is prescribed off-label, an official
assessment of effectiveness and safety for that
purpose has not taken place. Off-label use of
medication to treat diseases is common practice [44,
45] but it is not clear how often medication is
prescribed off-label for enhancement purposes. In
case of Modafinil, estimates are that 90% of pre-
scriptions is off-label [46]. In other cases, the
borderline between enhancement and therapeutic
purposes may not be all that clear. For example, the
prescription of propranolol for exam- or performance-
anxiety is considered good medical practice in many
countries but can also be seen as a form of
enhancement.
An important moral concern regarding off-label
use of enhancing drugs regards the health risks of
such use in relation to effects—which are not always
what they are expected to be. Professionals should
assess this risk-benefit ratio of any drug they
prescribe off-label, but potential users have their
own responsibility as well. The model proposed by
Synofzik elsewhere in this issue adequately describes
how physicians should deal with off-label prescription
[47].
One aspect that receives little attention in Synof-
zik’s model concerns the moral responsibility of
physicians for participating in certain enhancement
practices. In a highly competitive society, social
pressure or even coercion may occur to use drugs in
order to live up to society’s requirements. Are doctors
‘complicit’ if they support such a society by prescrib-
ing performance supporting drugs on demand? In the
context of cosmetic surgery, Little has argued that
doctors are complicit if they side “with the suspect
norms of appearance”; norms that reflect or reinforce
an unjust system of beliefs, attitudes and practices,
such as racism and sexism [48]. While this kind of
suspect norms may play a part in cosmetic surgery,
this seems hardly the case in the context of psycho-
pharmacology. While some may find society’s em-
phasis on cognitive performance, 24/7 economic
activity, or individual happiness undesirable, and
resist the stimulation of these by way of psychophar-
macology, it would be difficult to argue that these
norms are unjust. However, some norms or practices
might be undesirable for other reasons and it can be
questioned to what degree doctors should become
‘complicit’ in these practices. For example, by
prescribing modafinil for shift workers sleep disorder
one could argue that doctors become ‘complicit’ in
adapting workers to the demands of employers and
society. Direct or indirect forms of coercion may take
place if employers would require their employees to
use enhancers [49]. Some professions, like those that
require high concentration and carry heavy responsi-
bilities like air traffic controllers, surgeons or military,
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may by more prone to such demands than others. This
again raises the question of the role and responsibility
of physicians who would prescribe such drugs off-
label. According to Glannon, “doctors may prescribe
medication necessary for certain types of work” [2,
p.114]. We believe, however, that more discussion is
necessary before reaching any conclusions here.
These concerns regarding the responsibilities of
doctors in prescribing off-label drugs for enhance-
ment purposes have important implications for policy.
First, more research into the safety and efficacy of
off-label use is necessary, because currently there is a
“gap in empirical research on off-label indications for
psychotropic medications” [50]. According to a recent
Dutch report there is a demand among physicians for
more information about off-label prescription [45].
The same report notes that 22–45% of the physicians
—depending on their specialism—are not aware
when a prescription is off-label and that a consider-
able number of physicians do not inform or ask
patients their consent. It is therefore, secondly, the
task of professional medical organizations to raise
awareness and increase knowledge regarding off-label
practices in general, and to start the discussion
regarding off-label use for enhancement purposes in
particular.
A promising approach in order to gain insight in
the use and safety of enhancers may be to find new
ways of pharmacovigilance; “the process of evaluat-
ing and improving the safety of marketed medicines”
[59]. In the current system, safety of off-label use of
enhancers can only be assessed after they are being
introduced to the market. The existing system,
however, is criticized as having a limited effective-
ness, limited stakeholder participation and a lack of
transparency and legitimacy [57]. Moreover, it is
questioned whether the existing model of pharmaco-
vigilance can meet the challenges of 21st century drug
development, the increasing expectations of consum-
ers and the benefits of new, more complex technol-
ogies [59]. New ways of pharmacovigilance may
provide more opportunity for active stakeholder
participation such as users of enhancers, health care
professionals and the pharmaceutical industry and for
communicating safety information with health care
professionals, patients and consumers [58]. Consulta-
tion of consumer and patient organizations can be
involved, as well as weblogs and Internet communi-
ties of people who experiment with such drugs.
Regulating Non-Prescription Use of Enhancers?
Considering the global market in pharmaceuticals it
seems practically impossible to prevent the use of
drugs with enhancing effects. Even when prescrip-
tions or over the counter sales of certain drugs for
enhancement purposes would be prohibited, people
would still find ways to use them. Especially when
enhancing medicines are at the same time registered
for treatment of acknowledged medical conditions, it
will be near impossible to prevent people from
obtaining and using them. Online access is easy and
many people will probably be interested in possibil-
ities to enhance cognitive and other mental functions,
as is the case with cosmetic surgery and sexual
function. Right now, people are using drugs for their
enhancing effects, but without any medical supervi-
sion or safety-checks.
Safety is an important issue in regulating drugs and
one argument in favour of making enhancing drugs
available though doctors or pharmacists is that this
might prevent unsafe illegal practices. Many drugs
purchased on the Internet are not of good quality, or
may be counterfeit [51]. Another issue is that the
information regarding these drugs is not very reliable;
balanced information is hard to come by, so truly
informed use is difficult. From the point of view of
safety, it would be wise policy to find ways to make
reliable information available for potential users, and
to warn against false promises, and risky or unsafe
practices. Such information should preferable be
aimed at groups who are prone to abuse (e.g. students
during examination time). The government should
take responsibility to make sure potential users are
informed of the realistic effects and risks of online
‘smart drugs’, for example by publishing a consumer
alert for such drugs, as has been done, e.g. for at
home genetic testing9. Such an alert should warn
about inflated expectations and the risks of Internet
purchases, give a realistic image of side effects, and
advice to seek professional help or consultation in
case of underlying psychological, social or physical
problems.
9 see for example the brochure with the appropriate title A
healthy dose of scepticism may be the best prescription, http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/health/hea02.shtm
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Conclusions
It is to be expected that in the near future new
psychoactive medication will be developed that is
primarily intended for specific disorders or diseases,
but that can have enhancing effects on various mental
functions in healthy people as well. These effects will
probably be moderate, will enhance certain functions
while impeding others, and may not work equally
well for everyone. Still, the use of these psychoactive
drugs is likely to expand beyond current medical
indications. First, medical indications themselves are
likely to expand, and so will prescriptions for
conditions that we currently do not recognize as
disorders. Second, off-label prescription of medica-
tion for explicit enhancement purposes is also likely
to expand, as is the use of enhancing drugs without
any prescription, e.g. purchased on the Internet.
Throughout this paper we have assumed that a
general categorical prohibition of psychopharmaco-
logical enhancers is neither a desirable nor a realistic
option. In the literature on cognitive enhancement that
has accumulated over the last years, there are few, if
any, authors who argue for a categorical prohibition of
enhancing drugs. The ethical concerns that are raised
here as well as in the literature contribute to finding
responsible ways of dealing with these new develop-
ments [55].
As more or more powerful drugs with enhancing
potential become available, there will be an increasing
need for regulation of these drugs. Various regulatory
options exist, ranging from off- or on-label prescrip-
tion by doctors, to commercial prescriptions by
cosmetic neurologists or schmocters, to over the
counter sales. The discussion about changing or
adapting existing regulations has already started [29,
30, 47]. Safety and efficacy are important consid-
erations here, as is justice when it comes to the
question of reimbursements. We have not answered
(or dealt with) those issues here but wish to
emphasize the importance of critical evaluation of
the expected benefits and drawbacks of new enhanc-
ing drugs not only on an individual but also on a
societal level. The important ethical question that
remains open for further discussion is how concerns
about the collective social consequences of enhance-
ment should be taken into account and translated into
policymaking. How can worries about collective
effects such as resulting inequalities, normalization
and exclusion of differences, or promotion of a 24/7
rat-race society be translated into policymaking with
regard to enhancing drugs? How can collective
benefits as well as side effects be assessed in our
pluralistic liberal society, where opinions about the
good life and the good society are so widely varied?
These are questions that need to be on the ethical
enhancement agenda.
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